



The recent European economic policy debate has
frequently focussed on the Scandinavian countries
of Denmark, Finland and Sweden. The “Scan-
dinavian model” has been hailed as a role model for
others to follow, as it seems able to generate high
output growth and high employment as well as
macroeconomic stability. Some even refer to a
“Nordic miracle” (see, for example, Dutch Ministry
of Finance 2005).
The Scandinavian countries are characterised by
large government sectors, generous social insurance,
a focus on active labour market policy, high tax
rates, high degrees of unionisation, coordinated
wage bargaining and low income inequality. This
has led many observers to view the Scandinavian
model as a successful way of combining equity and
efficiency. The model is often regarded as an alter-
native to the Anglo-Saxon model, which seems to
attain efficiency only at the cost of low equity. This
point has been made forcefully by, for example,
Sapir (2005), who contrasts the Scandinavian and
Anglo-Saxon models with the Continental (high
equity but low efficiency) and Mediterranean (both
low equity and low efficiency) ones. This view also
often holds that the combination of generous unem-
ployment insurance and low employment protection
is a good way of achieving both high employment
and high social protection. Denmark’s so-called
flexicurity model in particular is seen as a role model
for others to follow (for example, The Economist
2006).
This chapter reviews the achievements of the
Scandinavian model, seeking to supply a balanced
assessment of its strengths and weaknesses. The aim is
to draw conclusions on what there is for other coun-
tries to learn: both from successful policies that could
be copied and from policy failures that should be
avoided. 
Some of the recent growth success of the Scandi-
navian countries is a recovery from earlier crises (re-
cessions in the early 1990s in Finland and Sweden and
high unemployment already in the 1980s in Den-
mark), although the recovery has been only partial in
terms of employment. However, the recent Scandi-
navian experiences also show that other economic
models than the Anglo-Saxon one can deliver growth
and employment. 
What are the causes of the Scandinavian successes? A
key factor appears to be a well-educated workforce.
But the improvements in economic developments in
the Scandinavian countries over the last decade have
also been associated with important – but moderate –
steps in a market-liberal direction. This applies in par-
ticular to product and service markets where there
have been substantial deregulations in all three
Scandinavian countries. It applies also to labour mar-
ket reforms in Denmark. So, the Scandinavian experi-
ences certainly do not provide evidence that market
incentives do not matter. On the contrary, the failure
to restore employment to earlier levels in Sweden is
clearly associated with the earlier lack of labour mar-
ket reform. High total rates of benefit dependency in
all three countries reflect serious incentive problems.
Especially Sweden, with very high sickness absence,
has been more successful in delivering what is labelled
employment in the statistics than securing that the
employed actually work.
The greatest achievement of the Scandinavian model
may be the stable public finances, which stand in stark
contrast to the developments in many other countries.
The obvious explanation seems to be the magnitude
of earlier fiscal crises, which has fostered a consensus
on the need for fiscal discipline.
An analysis of the Scandinavian approach is impor-
tant for the lessons that can be drawn for economic
policy making. But it is also worthwhile to reflect on
how various role models are used in the policy
debate. One aspect of “internationalisation” is the
increased importance attached to what is perceived
as successful examples of policy making in other
countries. Such international “benchmarking” has
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great merits, as it helps identify successful policies.
But there is also the risk that “the grass is always
seen as greener somewhere else” because of insuffi-
cient knowledge of the performance – and the caus-
es of the performance – of other countries. There is
often a tendency wrongly to attribute economic per-
formance associated with cyclical developments to
more deep-rooted institutions.
There is a risk of overselling economic models that
appear for a time to be very successful.1 In countries
with severe economic problems, people tend to look
for contrasting examples. At the same time, policy
makers in successful countries have strong incentives
to “market” their own policies abroad, as a good
international reputation gives prestige in the domestic
policy debate. The use of the Scandinavian model as
such a role model in much of the European economic
debate reflects to some extent such overselling.
2. The anatomy of the Scandinavian model
The characteristic features of the Scandinavian
model are a large government sector, generous
social protection, high tax rates, an emphasis on
active labour market policy, a high degree of union-
isation, and highly coordinated wage bargaining
(see Tables 4.1a–b for a summary).
Column 2 in Table 4.1a shows government expendi-
tures as a share of GDP. Among the countries shown,
Sweden has the highest government expenditure share
with 56.2 percent, which is around 10 percentage
points higher than the euro area average. Denmark
and Finland, also with govern-
ment expenditure shares above
50 percent, rank as number three
and four, respectively. 
Column 4 in Table 4.1a gives
government employment as a
share of working-age popula-
tion. All three Scandinavian
countries rank above the other
countries in this respect. The
share is highest in Denmark and
Sweden – around 12 percentage points higher than the
euro area average – and somewhat lower in Finland –
around 7 percentage points higher than the euro area
average. However, government employment shares
have not grown over the last fifteen years: as shown in
Figure 4.1, the share has fallen substantially in
Sweden, whereas it is now more or less the same in the
other two countries as around 1990.
Column 6 in Table 4.1a illustrates the degree of social
protection by showing a measure of the average net
replacement rate (after taxes and transfers) of unem-
ployment benefits for different types of wage-earners
over a five-year period of unemployment. Among the
countries shown, Denmark has the highest replace-
ment rate with 70 percent. Finland (with 65 percent)
and Sweden (with 63 percent) also rank high (as num-
ber five and seven, respectively).
Another aspect of social protection is employment
regulation, which is shown in column 8 in Table 4.1a.
Here the Scandinavian countries stand out less.
Sweden is among the countries with the highest
employment protection, although it is even higher in
Portugal, Spain and France. Finland is ranked in the
middle. Compared to most other EU countries,
employment protection is low in Denmark, although
it is not as low as in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Columns 10 and 12 in Table 4.1a capture the impor-
tance of active labour market policy. Column 10
shows that Denmark is the country that devotes most
resources to active labour market programmes
(around 1.8 percent of GDP) with Sweden third
(1.2 percent of GDP). Finland ranks as number five
Figure 4.1
1 For example, in the 1980s, the US was
considered as going through a crisis, while
the Japanese model of lifetime employ-
ment and the German model of vocation-
al training and worker participation in
management were much praised.
Perceptions changed when the latter two
countries experienced protracted stagna-
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3with spending of around 1 percent of GDP.
Column 12 gives the share of expenditures on active
policies in total expenditures for the unemployed.
With this measure, Sweden ranks second (after the
UK!), but Denmark only eighth. And Finland turns
out to be one of the countries with the least emphasis
on active labour market policy if this metric is used.
High taxes are the other side of high government
expenditure and high social protection. This is illus-
trated in column 2 in Table 4.1b, which gives the aver-
age tax wedge on labour. The average tax wedge is
highest in Sweden with 42 percent, nearly 10 percent-
age points above the euro area average. Finland is
also among the European countries with the highest
tax wedges, whereas Denmark is close to the euro area
average. Column 4 in Table 4.1b shows marginal
labour tax rates for high-paid workers. With 60 to
70 percent marginal tax rates, the Scandinavian coun-
tries rank high (Sweden second, Denmark third and
Finland sixth) among the countries shown.
Columns 6, 8 and 10 in Table 4.1b relate to wage set-
ting. As can be seen in column 6, the three Scandi-
navian economies are the ones with the highest
degrees of unionisation (70 to 80 percent). Column 8
shows the nearly universal coverage of collective
agreements (90 percent in Sweden and Finland,
80 percent in Denmark).2 Column 12 shows that wage
bargaining is highly coordinated in especially Finland
and Denmark. Finland stands out as the country with
the highest coordination of all the countries shown.
This reflects the importance of “social contracts”
negotiated between the peak-level labour market
organisations and the government. In Denmark and
Sweden, the main locus of bargaining is the industry
level, but with a substantial amount of informal coor-
dination. In both countries, substantial changes in
bargaining arrangements have occurred over time.
This has involved a larger role for local bargaining in
deciding how wage increases negotiated at the indus-
try level are to be distributed among individual
employees. In Denmark, the influence of local bar-
gaining over aggregate wage increases seems also to
have increased over time (Det ökonomiske råd 2003;
Andersen and Svarer 2006), whereas developments in
Sweden have taken a U-turn. In the 1980s and in the
first half of the 1990s, there was a trend towards more
decentralised determination of aggregate wage
increases in Sweden when the old centralised system






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 See also Ch. 3 of EEAG (2004).EEAG Report 87
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abandoned, but from the late 1990s the degree of
coordination has increased again with more coopera-
tion among formally independent bargaining units
(Avtalsrörelsen och lönebildningen 2005). This devel-
opment may not be fully captured by the data in the
table, which refer to 1995 to 2000.
The three Scandinavian countries stand out as very
equitable both in terms of gross earnings and house-
hold income, as shown in Table 4.2.3 In 2003, the
gross earnings ratios between the 9th and 1st deciles
were in the 2.3 to 2.6 range, whereas the averages for
the euro area and the Anglo-Saxon countries were 3.2
and 3.5, respectively. Among the countries in the
table, Sweden ranks first, Finland second and Den-
mark third. The corresponding average ratio for
household income (after taxes and transfers) in the
Scandinavian countries was 2.9 in 2001 against an
average of 3.9 in the euro area and 4.1 and 5.5 for the
UK and the US, respectively. Here, Denmark ranks
first, Sweden second and Finland fifth.
However, income inequality in terms of both gross
earnings and household income has increased in all
three Scandinavian countries since 1994. Gross
earnings dispersion in the Scandinavian countries
has followed the same trend as in the Anglo-Saxon
countries, although at a slower pace. This develop-
ment reflects lower wage growth for unskilled than
for skilled employees. Economists usually explain
this by an increase in the relative demand for skilled
labour, induced by technical change biased in its
favour. However, the increases in household
inequality in the Scandinavian countries during the
1994 to 2001 period has no counterpart in the UK
and the US.
3. Recent growth experiences
Much of the recent discussion about the Scan-
dinavian model has focused on its perceived ability to
generate higher growth than in especially the large
euro countries. As can be seen from Table 4.3, GDP
per capita has grown fast in Finland and Sweden over
the last decade. In 1995 to 1999, only Ireland of the
countries shown had higher growth of GDP per capi-
ta than Finland. Also Sweden was considerably above
the euro area average. In 2000 to 2005, the Finnish
and Swedish growth rates were exceeded or matched
only by Greece, Ireland and the UK. In contrast,
Denmark has grown more or less at par with the euro-
zone.
The earlier growth experiences of the Scandinavian
countries differ substantially. Whereas GDP per
capita in Finland grew by around three percent per
year in 1970 to 1889, growth in Sweden and
Denmark was around one percentage point lower.
Finland and Sweden share a very weak growth per-
formance in the first half of the 1990s, when both
countries were exposed to severe recessions associat-
ed with large shortfalls of demand (see Section 4.1):
output per capita then declined in both countries.
Part of the fast growth in both countries over the
last decade represents a cyclical recovery from the
earlier deep recession. This aspect is often missed in
other countries when Finland and Sweden are put
forward as role models. For Denmark, the overall
picture is not, however, affected by any such large
cyclical swings: here growth developments have
been more even.
A feature of growth in Finland and Sweden that is
often overlooked concerns the difference between out-
put and real income developments. These differences
are small for most countries, but large for Finland and
Sweden. The explanation is that the recent fast GDP
growth has been accompanied by large terms of trade
losses: these can be explained mainly by falling rela-
tive prices of ICT products, which make up a larger
proportion of exports than imports for the two coun-
tries. Figure 4.2 shows how large adjustments should
be made to arrive at a measure of real domestic in-
come (“command GDP” according to OECD termi-
nology). For Finland, average annual growth is
revised downwards by 0.3 and 0.9 percentage points
in 1995 to 1999 and 2000 to 2005, respectively. The
downward adjustment for Sweden is 0.4 percentage
points in both periods.4 In contrast, for Denmark,
there are upward adjustments by 0.2 and 0.4 percent-
age points for the two periods.
Figure 4.3 shows that the performance of the
Scandinavian countries is more “normal” in terms of
command GDP growth than in terms of GDP
growth. And Denmark fares much better relative to
the two other Scandinavian countries.  3 Gross earnings inequality measures how different employees fare: it
is a measure of wage inequality, which captures among other things
firms’ willingness to pay for different skill categories. In contrast,
household income inequality captures inequality in living standards.
It not only reflects inequality in wages but also inequality in capital
income as well as patterns of labour market participation and the
way taxes and transfers affect those outcomes.
4 Such deteriorations in the terms of trade are one of the drawbacks
of artificially stimulating high technology industries, as we point out
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3.1 Productivity developments
The recent higher GDP growth in Finland and
Sweden than in the large euro countries is explained
mainly by higher labour productivity growth (see
Table 4.4). In 1970 to 1989, labour productivity
growth in Sweden was substantially lower than the
euro area average, whereas it reached almost the
same level in 1990 to 1994. Over
the whole 1970 to 1994 period,
productivity growth in Finland
was more or less at par with that
in the euro area. As is well-
known, productivity growth in
the euro area decreased after
1995, mainly driven by develop-
ments in the large euro
economies.5 This has been the
subject of an intensive debate at
the European level (see, for
example, EU 2004 and EEAG
2006). Developments in Den-
mark have more or less followed
the general European trend. In
contrast, productivity growth
increased in both Finland and
Sweden after 1995. Productivity
developments in the two coun-
tries thus showed a pattern simi-
lar to the US. The fact that pro-
ductivity increases in Finland
and Sweden were even larger in
2000 to 2004 than in 1995 to 1999 suggests a shift in
the growth trend on top of the temporary increase in
growth associated with the cyclical recovery begin-
ning around 1995.
Table 4.5 shows that the main contributing factor to
recent high growth in labour productivity in Finland
and Sweden has been high growth in total factor pro-
ductivity.6 In 2000 to 2004,
Finland (together with Ireland)
had the highest total factor pro-
ductivity growth of the countries
shown, whereas Sweden came in
third. As with labour productiv-
Table 4.3 
GDP growth per capita (annual averages), percent, 1970-2005
1970–79 1980–89 1990–94 1995–99 2000–05
Denmark 1.8 1.6 1.8 2.2 1.0
Finland 2.9 3.0 -2.5 4.1 2.0
Sweden 1.6 2.1 -0.8 2.8 1.8
Weighted average 
Scandinavian countries 2.0 2.2 -0.5 3.0 1.6
Austria 3.6 1.9 1.4 2.7 1.0
Belgium 3.0 1.7 1.0 2.1 1.0
France 2.8 1.6 0.5 2.1 0.9
Germany 2.8 1.9 4.7 1.5 0.6
Greece 4.0 0.3 0.4 2.6 3.9
Ireland 3.3 2.7 2.8 8.3 3.7
Italy 2.5 2.3 0.8 1.4 0.1
Netherlands 2.2 1.5 1.1 3.2 0.3
Portugal 3.5 2.9 1.1 3.7 0.1
Spain 2.7 2.4 1.0 3.5 1.6
Weighted average  
euro area 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 0.9
UK 2.3 2.7 1.1 2.7 2.0
US 2.5 2.4 1.1 3.0 1.5
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook and National Accounts Databases. 
Figure 4.2
5 The pattern is clearest in Belgium,
Germany, Italy and Spain. But in
2000–04, productivity growth also fell to
low levels in Austria, France, the Nether-
lands and Portugal. Ireland and Greece,
with high rates of productivity growth,
deviate from this pattern.
6 Total factor productivity measures the
efficiency with which both capital and
labour are used. So-called growth account-
ing is used to decompose output growth
into contributions from labour growth,
capital growth (or as above from growth
in different types of capital, such as ICT
and non-ICT capital) and total factor pro-
ductivity growth. In a similar way, one can
decompose labour productivity growth
into growth of the capital–labour ratio
(capital deepening) and growth of total
factor productivity. Capital deepening can
in turn be decomposed into ICT and non-
ICT capital deepening. See Chapter 3 of
EEAG (2006) for a more detailed discus-
sion.ity growth, total factor productivity growth was
faster in 2000 to 2004 than in 1995 to 1999 in
Sweden, whereas it fell between the two periods in
Finland. 
Denmark, with recently only modest growth in total
factor productivity, deviates from the two other
Scandinavian countries. For Denmark, capital
deepening, that is an increase in the capital stock
relative to employment, has
been the most important driver
of labour productivity. This
applies to both ICT and non-
ICT capital deepening. How-
ever, ICT capital deepening has
also been important for both
Sweden and Finland. Overall,
the contributions to labour pro-
ductivity growth from ICT cap-
ital deepening have been larger
in the Scandinavian countries
than in the eurozone.
Another way of decomposing
labour productivity growth is to
calculate the contributions from
different sectors. Table 4.6
shows significantly higher con-
tributions to aggregate produc-
tivity growth from ICT-produc-
ing sectors in both Sweden and Finland than in
most eurozone countries in 1995 to 2003. This was
the consequence of both higher productivity growth
and a larger GDP share for these sectors. But high-
er productivity growth in ICT-using sectors also
contributed to the higher overall productivity
growth. In contrast, sectors classified as neither
ICT-producing nor ICT-using contributed less to
productivity growth in the
Scandinavian countries than in
the euro area.
Recent empirical research has
found ICT investment to have
been a major determinant of the
acceleration of productivity
growth in the US (for example,
Oliner and Sichel 2000). Other
work has pointed to a relation-
ship between ICT investment and
productivity growth among
OECD countries (Nicoletti and
Scarpetta 2005a; Annenkov and
Madaschi 2005). Since ICT
investment has been relatively
more important in Sweden and
Finland than in most Conti-
nental Western European coun-
tries, this offers one potential
explanation of the higher pro-






Growth in GDP per hour (annual averages), percent, 1970–2004
1970–79 1980–89 1990–94 1995–99 2000–04
Denmark 3.6 2.4 2.4 1.8 1.4
Finland 3.8 2.9 2.1 2.7 2.8
Sweden 2.4 1.5 2.0 2.4 2.6
Weighted average 
Scandinavian countries 3.1 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3
Austria 4.4 1.4 0.9 3.2 1.4
Belgium 4.0 2.1 2.9 2.7 0.6
France 4.0 3.0 1.5 2.1 1.5
Germany 4.0 2.2 3.0 1.9 1.2
Greece 4.9 0.1 0.1 2.2 2.9
Ireland 4.8 3.6 3.2 6.3 4.2
Italy 4.0 2.1 2.0 1.2 -0.4
Netherlands 3.7 2.2 1.0 1.7 0.7
Portugal 3.7 2.0 3.9 2.1 0.5
Spain 6.0 3.2 2.7 0.1 0.1
Weighted average  
euro area 4.3 2.4 2.2 1.7 0.8
UK 3.1 2.4 3.2 1.9 2.0
US 1.7 1.5 1.4 2.3 2.8
Sources: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Growth
Accounting Database and Total Economy Database.EEAG Report 91
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Table 4.5 
Contributions to average annual growth in GDP per hour, percentage points, 1990–2004










1990–94 2.4 0.6 0.5 1.3
1995–99 1.8 1.0 0.5 0.3
2000–04 1.4 0.5 1.0 – 0.1
Finland
1990–94 2.1 0.5 1.1 0.5
1995–99 2.7 0.5 – 0.7 2.8
2000–04 2.8 0.6 0.2 2.0
Sweden
1990–94 2.0 0.5 0.7 0.7
1995–99 2.4 1.0 0.2 1.2
2000–04 2.6 0.4 0.3 1.9
Average Scandinavian 
countries
1990–94 2.2 0.5 0.8 0.9
1995–99 2.3 0.9 0.0 1.4
2000–04 2.3 0.5 0.5 1.3
Austria
1990–94 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.0
1995–99 3.2 0.6 0.8 1.8
2000–04 1.4 0.4 0.8 0.2
Belgium
1990–94 2.9 0.5 0.9 1.6
1995–99 2.7 0.9 0.2 1.5
2000-04 0.6 0.4 – 0.1 0.3
France
1990–94 1.5 0.2 1.3 0.0
1995–99 2.1 0.4 0.6 1.1
2000–04 1.5 0.2 0.9 0.5
Germany
1990–94 3.0 0.4 0.9 1.8
1995–99 1.9 0.5 0.4 1.0
2000–04 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.6
Greece
1990–94 0.1 0.2 0.3 – 0.3
1995–99 2.2 0.4 0.4 1.4
2000–04 2.9 0.3 0.8 1.8
Ireland
1990–94 3.2 0.1 0.7 2.4
1995–99 6.3 0.6 0.9 4.8
2000–04 4.2 0.3 1.8 2.0
Italy
199094 2.0 0.3 1.0 0.7
1995–99 1.2 0.5 0.6 0.1
2000–04 – 0.4 0.3 0.4 – 1.2
Netherlands
1990–94 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.3
1995–99 1.7 0.6 – 0.1 1.3
2000–04 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.2
Portugal
1990–94 3.9 0.3 2.1 1.6
1995–99 2.1 0.6 0.6 0.8
2000–04 0.5 0.3 0.6 – 0.3
Spain
1990–94 2.7 0.3 1.3 1.1
1995–99 0.1 0.3 0.0 – 0.2
2000–04 0.1 0.2 0.4 – 0.53.2 Product market deregulations
Looking for “deeper” explanations of differences in
productivity growth among countries, the amount of
product market regulations is an obvious candidate.
There are a number of reasons why productivity
growth is likely to be stimulated by competition-
enhancing deregulation. This creates stronger incen-
tives to eliminate slack in the organisation because of
greater risks of losing market shares and because the
entry of more competitors provides better yardsticks
for comparing managerial performance. New com-
petitors often introduce new vintages of technology
and strengthen the incentives of incumbents to
upgrade their technology as well, at the same time as
the possibilities to do so through imitation are
increased. 
However, lower profit margins could also reduce the
return to investment in research, so ultimately the
net effect of deregulation on productivity growth is
an empirical issue. But recent research on panels of
sectors in the OECD countries does suggest that
lower levels of product market regulation are con-
ducive to productivity growth (Nicoletti and
Scarpetta 2003, 2005a). More specifically, a low
degree of product market regulation appears to
accelerate the catch-up of productivity in a given
sector in a country to the level of the most advanced
competitors elsewhere.
The OECD has calculated various measures of prod-
uct market regulations, some of which are shown in
Table 4.7. These measures capture various aspects
such as the degree of public ownership, regulations of
prices and other aspects of business operations, and
various barriers to entry such as legal and structural
impediments, administrative burdens and impedi-
ments to trade and foreign investment. The Scandi-
navian countries have low levels of product market
regulation – only somewhat higher than the Anglo-
Saxon countries – compared to several other Euro-
pean countries, but so have Germany and the Nether-
lands, which have experienced slow productivity
growth. And Finland, with the highest productivity
growth of the Scandinavian countries, has the least
deregulated product markets of these countries,
whereas Denmark, with the lowest productivity
growth, has the most deregulated markets. However,
OECD work has pointed to a correlation between
productivity growth and the degree of product mar-
ket regulation among OECD countries as well as
between the amount of ICT investment and the
degree of product market regulation (Nicoletti and
Scarpetta 2005a). This could help explain the high
level of such investment in the Scandinavian coun-
tries. A plausible hypothesis is that this correlation
could reflect that the incentives to invest in ICT to
win or defend market shares are stronger in a com-
petitive environment than in one where incumbents
are more protected.
The last four columns of Table 4.7 illustrate the
amount of change in product market deregulations in
various countries. Over the last two decades, product
markets have been deregulated everywhere.
According to the measure used, the percentage
change in the degree of regulation over the whole
1982 to 2003 period has been the third largest in
Denmark. The changes in deregulations have been
EEAG Report 92
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Table 4.5 (continued) 










1990–94 2.2 0.3 1.0 0.9
1995–99 1.7 0.5 0.4 0.8
2000–04 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.1
UK
1990–94 3.2 0.4 1.0 1.8
1995–99 1.9 0.9 0.2 0.7
2000–04 2.0 0.3 0.2 1.5
US
1990–94 1.4 0.5 0.2 0.8
1995–99 2.3 1.0 0.2 1.1
2000–04 2.8 0.6 0.5 1.7
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above the average of euro area countries also in
Finland and Sweden, but they have been even larger
in the Netherlands and Germany and of a similar
magnitude in Austria, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and
Spain. However, if one looks instead at the change in
regulations over the 1982–95 period, Finland and
Sweden stand out as very early deregulators. This tim-
ing of reforms is likely to have been important for
productivity developments over the last decade.
Product market deregulations in Sweden
The discussion above provides some support for the
hypothesis that high productivity growth in Sweden
and Finland has at least partly been driven by prod-
uct market deregulations. Evaluations made at the
national level in Sweden give even stronger support
for this. 
Swedish competition law was strengthened very
substantially in 1993 when it was brought into line
with EC regulations. Several network industries
that had earlier been shielded from competition –
rail transport, taxis, domestic air traffic, postal ser-
vices, telecommunication, and electricity genera-
tion and distribution – were deregulated in the first
half of the 1990s. Several empirical studies have
found substantial productivity effects from these
deregulations.7
Other evidence on the productivity effects of
increased competition is provided by case studies of a
number of sectors in a recent report from the man-
agement-consulting group McKinsey & Company
(2006). The report is a follow-up of an earlier study
(McKinsey & Company 1995), which emphasised
how low competitive intensity and comprehensive reg-
ulations in many sectors hampered productivity
developments in Sweden. The new report takes the
automotive industry (trucks and cars) as an example
of how the absence of regulatory and trade barriers
has necessitated a high rate of efficiency improve-
ment. According to the report, Swedish automakers –
together with Japanese – have a leading international
position in terms of labour productivity.
The new report also emphasises how extensive dereg-
ulations in some sectors have led to fast productivity
growth relative to both earlier periods and other
countries. In retailing, competition has been promot-
ed primarily by changes in zoning laws and in munic-
ipal practice, which have made it easier for new
entrants to obtain retail licenses. In food processing,
the dismantling of remaining import restrictions and
the opening up of a large export market in connection
with the Swedish EU entry in 1995 is picked out as a
crucial factor. The take-over of several Swedish food
producers by foreign, more efficient, owners is also
emphasised. There has also been more pressure on
food producers to cut costs because of the increased
competition in food retailing. In retail banking, dereg-
ulations have made it easier for new entrants to
obtain licenses.
To make their case regarding the importance of com-
petition in Sweden, McKinsey and Company (2006)
contrasts the developments in the automotive indus-
try, retailing, food processing and banking with that
in construction, where deregulations have been
almost absent. According to the report, the latter sec-
tor is characterised by rigid zoning laws, a bureau-
cratic planning process, detailed building codes, col-
lusive behaviour and extensive regulation of the tasks
that various types of construction workers can per-
form (see also OECD 2004b). The result is a low level
of efficiency. The McKinsey and Company report
estimates that 20 to 30 percent of building costs are
pure “waste” (unused working time, unused operat-
ing time of machinery, material waste, building errors
and theft). 
3.3 Human capital and R&D
Another probable determinant of high productivity
growth in Finland and Sweden is human capital
accumulation. Table 4.8 shows that the percentage of
the working-age population with tertiary education is
very high in the Scandinavian countries (the average
being 34 percent versus 23 percent in the euro area
excluding Finland): only the US (39) and Japan (37)
score higher. Looking at shares of the population
with at least upper secondary education gives a simi-
lar picture. In the PISA measures of student perfor-
mance, Finland stands out with the best results
among OECD countries (Figure 4.4). Sweden does
not rank as high but is also clearly above the euro
area average, whereas Denmark ranks significantly
lower.
Skill–capital complementarity is a possible explana-
tion of high productivity growth in Finland and
Sweden. Such complementarity might be particularly
important for the diffusion of ICT technology.
Several studies for the US have found evidence of
7 See OECD (2004b), Regelutredningen (2005) and Fölster and
Peltzman (2006a,b) for surveys of these studies.complementarity between computers and skilled
labour at both the industry and establishment level.8
For Sweden, Gunnarsson,
Mellander and Savvidou (2004)
have obtained similar results
using panel data for various
manufacturing sectors. The
largest productivity effects seem
to be associated with the interac-
tion between ICT investment
and employees with upper sec-
ondary education, but there
appears to be strong comple-
mentarity also between ICT and
university educated engineers.
The complementarity hypothesis
together with the fact that the
educational qualifications of the
work force have increased provides a possible expla-





Percentage of working age
population with at least upper 
secondary education
Rank




Denmark 81 6 32 5
Finland 78 8 34 4
Sweden 83 5 35 3
Average Scandinavian 
countries 81 34
Austria 80 7 18 18
Belgium 64 14 30 7
France 65 12 24 16
Germany 84 3 25 14
Greece 56 17 21 17
Ireland 63 16 28 10
Italy 48 18 11 20
Netherlands 71 11 29 9
Portugal 25 20 13 19
Spain 45 19 26 12
Average euro area except 
Finland 60 23
        
Switzerland 85 2 28 10
UK 65 13 26 12
US 88 1 39 1
Australia 64 15 31 6
New Zealand 78 9 25 14
Average Anglo-Saxon 
countries 74 30
Japan 84 4 37 2
South Korea 74 10 30 7
Source: OECD (2005d). 
Figure 4.4
8 See, for example, Autor, Katz and
Krueger (1998), and Bresnahan, Brynjolfs-
son and Hitt (2002).EEAG Report 97
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growth has become larger over time according to the
study (and why recent studies in general find large
productivity effects of such investment, whereas ear-
lier studies did not).
High spending on R&D is likely to have been anoth-
er contributing factor to high productivity growth in
Finland and Sweden. As can be seen in Figure 4.5,
Sweden and Finland are at the top among the coun-
tries shown and Denmark only somewhat below. A
number of recent studies have documented the
growth effects of R&D spending. These include, for
example, Griffith et al. (2004), Zachariadis (2004) and
Aiginger and Falk (2005), using data from OECD
countries. OECD (2003a) estimates suggest that a
10 percent increase in business R&D expenditures, on
average corresponding to around 0.1 percent of GDP
in OECD countries, boosts short-term GDP growth
by 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points. This could imply a
long-run effect on the level of GDP per capita of
about 1.2 percent under the assumption that changes
in R&D do not permanently affect output growth.9
Ali-Yrkkö and Maliranta (2006) have analysed the
productivity impact of R&D using a panel data set of
Finnish firms over the period 1996–2004. There is an
economically and statistically significant effect after
three to five years, but not before, which suggests the
existence of substantial lags between R&D invest-
ment and productivity.
3.4 Can we explain productivity
developments in the Scandinavian
countries?
Summing up, how well can we
explain the recent good produc-
tivity performance in Finland
and Sweden? Both ICT-produc-
ing sectors (particularly in Fin-
land) and ICT-using ones (partic-
ularly in Sweden) have made
large contributions. High invest-
ment in ICT capital is also likely
to be an important contributing
factor. There is reason to believe
that a well-educated work force
has interacted with ICT invest-
ment in generating high produc-
tivity growth. Early product mar-
ket deregulations are likely to have created strong
incentives for efficiency increases and facilitated the
adoption of ICT technology.
4. Labour market outcomes 
Labour market developments have differed substan-
tially between the three Scandinavian countries. A
first illustration is provided by Table 4.9 and Figure
4.6, which show how registered unemployment has
developed. In Denmark, unemployment rose substan-
tially from the mid-1970s and reached a peak as early
as 1983. There were reductions in the late 1980s, but a
new higher peak was reached in 1993. After that, large
reductions occurred during a ten-year period, al-
though there has been a small increase again in the
last few years. 
Finland, and in particular Sweden, managed to hold
down unemployment until the 1990s, when it rose
dramatically and reached peaks that were unprece-
dented in these countries. The peak in Finland and
the increase from 1970 to the peak year (1994) were
the second highest in the OECD area (only Spain
fared worse). After the dramatic increases, unem-
ployment fell again in both Finland and Sweden. In
Finland, there has been a continuous fall from 1994,
whereas unemployment in Sweden fell from 1998.
There were some increases again in Sweden in 2003 to
2005 before unemployment started to turn down
again in 2006. Denmark now belongs to the group of
OECD countries with the lowest unemployment.
Current unemployment in Sweden is somewhat high-
er, but lower than the euro area average although not
Figure 4.5
9 The empirical results on the effects of non-business (including
government) R&D are less clear-cut. R&D spending for defence
purposes, fundamental science and health research generate basic
knowledge with probable technology spillovers in the long term.
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as low as in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Finland is
among the OECD countries with the highest current
unemployment, although it is lower than in Greece,
France, Germany and Spain. Although the reduc-
tions in unemployment relative to the peak years
have been substantial in all three Scandinavian coun-
tries, only part of the earlier unemployment rises
have been recovered. The net result is that unemploy-
ment today is considerably higher (5.9 percentage
points in Finland, 4.0 percentage points in Sweden,
and 2.8 percentage points in Denmark) than in 1970.
The increases in unemployment relative to 1970 in
Finland and Sweden compare unfavourably with the
Anglo-Saxon countries (in particular the US where
unemployment fell marginally)
and also with Italy and the
Netherlands. But the increase in
Sweden is smaller than for the
euro area average, whereas the
reverse holds for Finland. The
Danish performance is impres-
sive: among the countries in the
table, unemployment develop-
ments between 1970 and 2006
were more favourable only in the
US, Italy and the UK.
An often noted feature of Scan-
dinavian labour markets is the
low incidence of long-term un-
employment, as indicated by
Figure 4.7. Long-term unemploy-
ment makes up a considerably
smaller fraction of total unem-
ployment than in most Conti-
nental Western European coun-
tries, although not as low as in
most Anglo-Saxon countries.
Another illustration of labour
market developments is provided
by Table 4.10 and Figure 4.8,
showing employment rates (em-
ployment as percentages of
working-age population). The
total employment rates in Den-
mark and Sweden are among the
highest in the OECD area.
Among the countries shown,
Denmark ranks second (after
Switzerland only) and Sweden
fourth (after New Zealand as
well). Finland ranks considerably
lower, and after all the Anglo-
Saxon countries, but with a high-
er employment rate than most of the other countries
in the eurozone. The high employment rates in
Denmark and Sweden in particular seem usually to be
what one has in mind when referring to the Nordic
“employment miracle”. The developments of employ-
ment mirror those of unemployment over the last fif-
teen years. In Finland and Sweden, the unemploy-
ment increases in the early 1990s had their counter-
parts in very large falls in the employment/population
ratios (by around 14 percentage points in Finland and
by nearly 12 percentage points in Sweden). From the
mid-1990s, employment rates have recovered, but the
earlier levels have not been restored. In Denmark, in
Figure 4.6
Figure 4.7contrast, the current employment rate is only margin-
ally below the earlier peak in the late 1980s.
Table 4.10 shows that the high employment rates in
the Scandinavian countries reflect to a large extent
high female employment. The Dutch Ministry of
Finance (2005) expresses this with the pregnant for-
mulation that “the employment success of the
Nordics is of a feminine nature”. Whereas the average
employment rate for men in the Scandinavian coun-
tries is only 3.1 percentage points higher than the euro
area average (74.8 percent versus 71.7 percent), the
difference is as large as 14.5 percentage points for
women (69.7 percent versus 55.2). 
Another noteworthy feature of the Swedish and
Danish labour markets is the high employment
among older workers. With almost 70 percent,
Sweden has the highest employment rate among all
the countries shown for 55 to 64 year olds. Denmark
ranks a bit lower with around 60 percent. In contrast,
employment rates for this age group are in the 30 to
40 percent range in most continental eurozone coun-
tries. Finland has been much less successful in this
respect with an employment rate for elderly workers
of only around 50 percent. Among the countries in
the table, only New Zealand can compete with





Employment rates, percentages of population in various age and gender groups, 2005
Total 15–64 Men 15–64 Women  
15–64 Total 15–24 Total 25–54 Total 55–64
Denmark 75.5 80.1 70.8 62.0 83.9 59.8
Finland 68.0 69.4 66.5 39.2 81.7 52.6
Sweden
a 73.5 75.0 71.8 51.5 82.9 69.5
Average 
Scandinavian 
countries 72.3 74.8 62.7 50.9 82.8 60.6
Austria 68.6 75.4 62.0 53.1 82.6 31.8
Belgium 61.0 67.7 54.1 26.6 78.3 32.1
France 62.3 67.8 56.9 26.0 79.6 40.7
Germany 65.5 71.4 59.6 42.6 77.4 45.5
Greece 60.3 74.5 46.2 25.3 74.3 41.6
Ireland 67.1 76.2 58.0 46.3 78.0 51.7
Italy 57.5 69.7 45.3 25.5 72.2 31.4
Netherlands
a 72.0 78.8 65.0 63.6 81.5 44.8
Portugal 67.5 73.4 61.7 36.1 80.8 50.5
Spain 64.3 76.4 51.9 41.9 74.7 43.1
       
Average euro area 
except Finland 63.4 71.7 55.2 36.2 76.9 41.0
Switzerland 77.2 83.9 70.4 59.9 85.1 65.0
         
UK 72.6 78.6 66.8 58.1 81.1 56.8
US 71.5 77.6 65.6 53.9 79.3 60.8
Australia 71.6 78.5 64.7 63.6 78.8 53.7
New Zealand 74.6 81.5 68.0 56.9 82.0 69.7
Average Anglo-Saxon
countries 72.6 79.1 66.3 58.1 80.3 60.3
Japan 69.3 80.4 58.1 40.9 79.0 63.9
South Korea 63.7 75.0 52.5 29.9 73.4 58.7
Note:
a) 2004.
Sources: OECD LFS Database and OECD (2006c).      EEAG Report 101
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In terms of youth employment, Denmark, with
62 percent, ranks very high (at par with Australia,
the Netherlands and Switzerland). With around
50 percent, Sweden ranks lower than the Anglo-
Saxon countries, but higher
than most continental euro
countries. Finland conforms
more to the general continental
European picture of low youth
employment.
Table 4.11 decomposes the differ-
ences in the overall employment
rate in the various countries
shown to the eurozone average
into contributions from males
and females and from various age
groups. The higher female em-
ployment rate in the Scandi-
navian countries explains the
bulk of the difference in the total
employment rate between the
Scandinavian countries and the
eurozone: on average, 7.5 percentage points out of
8.9, that is 84 percent of the difference. This is a con-
siderably larger share than for the Anglo-Saxon coun-
Figure 4.8
Table 4.11 
Contributions to differences in total employment rates relative to the euro area average  
from differences in employment rates for various gender and age groups, 2005
a)
Total 15–64 Men 15–64 Women 15–64 Total 15–24 Total 25–54 Total 55–64
Denmark 12.1 4.2 7.8 4.1 4.3 3.7
Finland 4.6 – 1.2 5.7 0.3 2.4 1.9
Sweden
b) 10.1 1.7 8.3 1.0 3.5 5.6
Average Scandinavian 
countries 9.2 1.6 7.5 1.7 3.5 4.0
          
Austria 5.2 1.8 3.5 3.0 3.8 – 1.5
Belgium – 2.4 – 2.0 – 0.4 – 1.7 1.0 – 1.4
France – 1.1 – 2.0 1.0 – 2.4 1.4 0.0
Germany 2.1 – 0.2 2.3 1.1 0.3 0.7
Greece – 3.1 1.4 – 4.4 – 1.8 – 1.6 0.2
Ireland 3.7 2.3 1.5 1.9 0.6 1.3
Italy – 5.9 – 1.0 – 4.8 – 1.5 – 2.8 – 1.5
Netherlands
b) 8.6 3.6 5.0 4.9 3.0 0.7
Portugal 4.1 0.8 3.4 0.0 2.6 1.6
Spain 0.9 2.4 – 1.5 1.3 – 1.1 0.6
Average euro area 
except Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          
Switzerland 13.8 6.1 7.7 4.1 5.4 4.3
          
Australia 8.2 3.4 4.9 5.4 1.1 1.8
New Zealand 11.2 4.8 6.6 4.2 3.0 4.1
UK 9.2 3.4 6.0 3.7 2.6 2.9
US 8.1 2.9 5.4 3.4 1.6 3.2
Average Anglo-Saxon 
countries 8.3 3.0 5.5 3.5 1.8 3.1
          
Japan 5.9 4.4 1.6 0.6 1.0 4.5
Korea 0.3 1.6 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 1.9 2.8
Notes:
a) Column 2, labeled "Total 15–64", shows how much higher the total employment rate is than the average for the euro area 
(except Finland). Columns 3 and 4 decompose this difference into contributions in percentage points from males and females, 
respectively. Columns 5–7 decompose the difference instead in contributions from different age groups. – 
b) 2004.
Source: OECD (2006c).tries, where a higher female employment rate explains
62 percent of the difference to the euro area (5.7 per-
centage points out of 9.2). Higher employment for
elderly workers accounts for about as much of the dif-
ference in overall employment to the euro area coun-
tries in the Scandinavian countries as in the Anglo-
Saxon ones (3.4 percentage points out of 8.9, that is
38 percent, versus 3.2 percentage points out of 9.2,
that is 35 percent). The other side of this is that, on
average, higher youth employment makes a smaller
contribution in the Scandinavian economies than in
the Anglo-Saxon ones to the higher overall employ-
ment rate than in the eurozone, although the contri-
bution is high in Denmark.
4.1 The determinants of (un)employment 
developments
Much empirical research has tried to account for un-
employment differences both across OECD countries
and over time (that is, to explain unemployment in a
panel of these countries). The main focus has been to
explain the development of structural (equilibrium)
unemployment by exploring the explanatory power of
differences in various institutional factors after con-
trolling for cyclical developments. 
General research results10
The panel data studies typically find that generous
unemployment benefits tend to raise unemployment.
Many of the studies find that high union density
and/or a high coverage of collective agreements do
the same. There is somewhat more uncertainty about
other variables. Although almost all studies find that
a high coordination of unions
(and employers) in wage bar-
gaining promotes low unem-
ployment, results on decentrali-
sation of bargaining to the level
of the firm differ. According to
the majority of studies, such
decentralisation results in higher
unemployment than bargaining
at the sector level, but a very
substantial minority supports
the Calmfors-Driffill (1988)
hypothesis of a hump-shaped
relationship between the degree
of coordination and unemploy-
ment (with the highest unemployment occurring
with an intermediate degree of coordination).11
Some studies have found labour tax wedges to be an
important determinant of structural unemployment,
whereas others have not. More recent studies, how-
ever, often allocate an important role to tax wedges
(for example, Belot and van Ours 2004, Nickell,
Nunziata and Ochel 2005, and Bassanini and Duval
2006). Only a few studies have looked at the effects
of product market regulations on unemployment,
but there is some evidence that a low degree of prod-
uct market regulation is conducive to low unemploy-
ment (for example, Nicoletti et al. 2001 and
Bassanini and Duval 2006).
Many studies have looked at the effects of active
labour market programmes. A common finding is
that a larger size of programmes tends to reduce
(open) unemployment. This is, however, to a large
extent likely to be a mechanical effect because jobless
workers are reclassified from unemployed to pro-
gramme participants. Indeed, it is clear that the use of
“active” programmes to interrupt spells of open
unemployment is a major explanation of the low inci-
dence of (registered) long-term unemployment in the
Scandinavian countries. This is illustrated for Sweden
in Figure 4.9, which compares average durations of
open unemployment and of registration as a jobseek-
er at a labour market office (implying that the regis-
tered person is either openly unemployed or partici-
pating in a labour market programme). Whereas the




10 See OECD (2006c) for an extensive sur-
vey of recent studies.
11 See Chapter 3 in EEAG (2004) for a review of the results of vari-
ous studies on this point.EEAG Report 103
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or less unchanged at around 100 days during the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1990s, the average duration of reg-
istration increased to almost two years and still
remains close to that level. 
It is uncertain whether placement in active labour
market programmes reduces the total jobless rate
(open unemployment plus programme participation)
and raises regular employment; indeed a number of
studies suggest the reverse (see Calmfors, Forslund
and Hemström 2004). There is some evidence that
labour market training is the active labour market
programme with the most favourable aggregate
effects on regular employment (Boone and van Ours
2004, Bassanini and Duval 2006), presumably because
the risk of crowding out of regular employment are
much smaller for such programmes than for sub-
sidised job schemes.
Conclusions on (un)employment levels in the
Scandinavian countries
Several features of the traditional Scandinavian
model are not conducive to low unemployment: gen-
erous unemployment benefits, high labour taxes, high
union density and wide coverage of collective agree-
ments. Factors that promote low unemployment are a
high degree of coordination of wage bargaining and
fairly deregulated product markets (see Section 3
above). Also, extensive active labour market pro-
grammes (mainly in Denmark and Sweden) are likely
to hold down open unemployment.
Evaluating the balance of factors, it may appear sur-
prising that employment outcomes are as good as
they are in the Scandinavian countries. A possible
explanation is that various factors interact in such a
way that the employment-friendly features of the
Scandinavian model are more effective in counteract-
ing the employment-hostile ones than elsewhere. For
example, high labour taxes are likely to have less
adverse effects on employment under highly coordi-
nated wage bargaining. The reason is that unions
then have to take into account that wage increases to
compensate for high taxes lead to rises in unemploy-
ment, which require further tax increases to pay for
the unemployed and so on. The studies of, for exam-
ple, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Nickell,
Nunziata and Ochel (2005) support this hypothesis.
Also, one would expect high union density and wide
coverage of collective agreements to have smaller
adverse unemployment effects the higher is the degree
of bargaining coordination. This hypothesis receives
empirical support in, for example, Belot and van
Ours (2004).
Lindgren (2006) focuses explicitly on interaction
effects. The conclusion is that high “latent wage pres-
sure” due to generous unemployment benefits, high
union density and low competition in product mar-
kets causes less unemployment in an economy with
highly coordinated wage bargaining than in one with
decentralised bargaining. The three Scandinavian
countries are the ones with the highest “latent wage
pressure” in Lindgren’s sample, and Finland and
Denmark, but not Sweden, have a high degree of
coordination in wage bargaining according to his
metric.12
Another interaction may be between active labour
market policy and unemployment insurance. Boone
and van Ours (2004) and Bassanini and Duval (2006)
find some evidence suggesting that high active labour
market expenditure could mitigate the adverse unem-
ployment effects of generous unemployment benefits.
The studies put forward the explanation that active
labour market programmes are an effective way of
testing benefit recipients’ availability for work. But a
more probable explanation is that the placement of a
large propotion of the jobless in labour market pro-
grammes represents a mechanical offset to increases
in open unemployment.
Empirical research thus gives some support for the
view that other institutional features in the Scan-
dinavian countries may to some extent offset the
adverse employment effects of high taxes, generous
unemployment benefits and high unionisation. But
there are also results that suggest the opposite, for
example, that generous unemployment compensation
is particularly problematic for employment if taxes
are high (Belot and van Ours 2004). In general, one
should be aware that the results on interaction among
various variables are not robust: different studies find
evidence of quite different interactions.13 So, we are
quite sceptical regarding results from studies of inter-
action effects.
The role of a large government sector
An important issue is whether the high government
employment in Denmark and Sweden (see Table 4.1)
12 Lindgren constructs an index of ”latent wage pressure” by aggre-
gating measures of the generosity of unemployment benefits, union
density and product market regulation into one score. 
13 See, for example, the overview in Belot and van Ours (2004).is likely to be a major cause of high overall employ-
ment there. The answer is no. As discussed above,
equilibrium (un)employment appears to be deter-
mined by a number of “labour market institutions”.
We are aware of no empirical studies that have found
government employment to be a determinant of
aggregate unemployment and employment rates. The
explanation is that a large government sector merely
crowds out private employment by raising the aggre-
gate wage level.
An interesting issue is, however, what implications a
large government sector has for measured GDP and
productivity. By raising the wage level and crowding
out private employment, private-sector productivity is
raised. The value added of non-market government
output is measured by the wage sum. If the wage is
above the marginal product of labour in the govern-
ment sector, GDP will be overestimated. This point
has been made by Sinn (2006). However, there are also
counter arguments. If activities are optimally distrib-
uted between the private and the government sectors,
measuring government output at wage costs (instead
of at “shadow” market prices) will instead lead to an
underestimation of GDP.
Female employment
According to recent research, high unemployment
benefits and high labour tax wedges, as in the Scan-
dinavian countries, exert a negative influence on
female employment as well as on employment of
other groups (Bassanini and Duval 2006). But there
are also factors in these countries that promote female
labour force participation and employment (Jaumotte
2004, Bassanini and Duval 2006). One such factor is
low relative taxation of second earners in a house-
hold: second earners are more or less taxed at the
same rates as single earners (especially in Finland and
Sweden), whereas tax rates for second earners are
considerably higher than for single earners (around
50 percent) in, for example, Belgium, Germany and
France due mainly to dependent spouse deductions
(OECD 2005c). In addition, high tax progressivity –
which makes it more beneficial for a household to
earn a given before-tax income through two bread-
winners than through only one – provides a strong
incentive for female labour force participation in the
Nordic countries.
Not surprisingly, the extent of childcare subsidisation
has also been shown to be important for female
labour market participation. Here, the Scandinavian
countries stand out as the OECD countries with the
most generous subsidies (OECD 2005c). Whereas
public expenditure on formal day-care and pre-prima-
ry education amounts to around 0.5 percent of GDP
in Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and the US and
to 0.8 percent in Germany, it amounts to 2.7 percent
in Denmark, 1.9 percent in Sweden and 1.5 percent in
Finland. Generous parental leave provisions in these
countries also appear to promote female labour-mar-
ket participation, according to existing studies.
That childcare subsidies raise female employment
does not necessarily mean they are desirable from a
social welfare point of view. On the one hand, the
subsidies tend to offset the distortionary effects of
high marginal taxes on labour supply. These effects
are larger for females than males, as female labour
supply is more elastic (see, for example, Aronsson
and Walker 2006). On the other hand, childcare sub-
sidies may create another distortion by generating
excessive consumption of childcare at the expense of
other goods and services. Rosen (1995) maintained
that the amount of subsidisation in Sweden is too
large and results in “too many mothers taking care
of other women’s children and too few being
involved in the production of non-household goods
and services”.14
Causes of the unemployment reductions in Finland and
Sweden
Above, we documented the reductions in unemploy-
ment (and rises in employment) that have taken place
in Denmark, Finland and Sweden from the mid-
1990s. The causes of these reductions seem to differ
substantially among the three countries. According to
the OECD (2006c), the unemployment reductions in
Sweden and Finland since the mid-1990s are fully
explained by cyclical recoveries.15 Similar results are
obtained by Lindblad and Sellin (2006) for Sweden
and by Honkapohja et al. (2006) for Finland. Using a
different modelling strategy, which tries explicitly to
model the determinants of equilibrium unemploy-
EEAG Report 104
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14 Note, however, that Rosen did not consider the fact that married
women’s labour supply decisions do not take into account the costs
for social assistance in case women end up as single mothers after
divorce. This externality has been claimed to be important (Kolm
and Lazear 2006). Note also that to the extent that childcare is pro-
vided by the government in the Scandinavian countries, instead of
within families, this tends to give an overestimation of GDP as com-
pared to countries with less government-provided childcare.
15 See Chapter 2 of the OECD study. The estimates build on statisti-
cal filtering techniques (so-called unobserved components models),
where Phillips-curve relationships are used to decompose actual
unemployment into a cyclical part and a structural (equilibrium)
part. The basic idea is that a decreasing rate of inflation is a sign of
actual unemployment exceeding structural unemployment and vice
versa. See also Richardson et al. (2000).EEAG Report 105
Chapter 4
ment as described above, Bassanini and Duval (2006)
also find that the whole of the Swedish unemploy-
ment reduction can be explained by a lower output
gap, whereas the finding for Finland is that this factor
accounts for around four fifths of the unemployment
reduction. 
The cyclical explanation of unemployment reductions
in Finland and Sweden is not surprising, as the large
unemployment rises in 1991 to 1993 in the two coun-
tries were clearly triggered by large shortfalls of
demand. There were deep financial crises with falling
asset prices and debt deflation after the bursting of
asset price bubbles. The crises were aggravated by the
attempts to defend fixed exchange rates by high inter-
est rates in a situation when earlier inflation had
already caused substantial real exchange rate appreci-
ations. The situation was made worse in Finland by
the loss of the Soviet export market and in Sweden by
the timing of a tax reform that substantially reduced
capital income tax rates and interest rate deductabili-
ty, thus raising post-tax interest rates even more than
pre-tax rates.16
The myth of Danish flexicurity
The favourable unemployment developments in
Denmark are of particular interest, as the Danish
flexicurity model has been hailed as a successful way
of combining flexibility (low employment protection)
with social security (for example generous unemploy-
ment compensation). The proponents of this view see
low employment protection as the key to high em-
ployment and claim that generous unemployment
support is of only secondary importance for employ-
ment (but of first-order importance for equity).17 In
line with this reasoning, the low degree of employ-
ment protection in Denmark is seen as a prime expla-
nation of the reduction in unemployment over the last
decade.
How well does this reasoning stand up to the facts?
The answer is: not very well. This type of flexicurity
explanation of low unemployment in Denmark is
somewhat of a myth.
A first problem with the low employment protection
explanation of Danish labour market developments is
that the empirical studies of (un)employment in pan-
els of countries discussed above usually fail to find
significant effects of employment protection on over-
all unemployment.18 Higher employment protection
appears to reduce both job creation and job destruc-
tion, but these changes seem more or less to cancel
out, leaving overall unemployment unchanged, even
though they lengthen the duration of unemployment.
Employment protection seems mainly to redistribute
unemployment among various groups: from old peo-
ple to young and from short-term to long-term unem-
ployed (see OECD 2006c).
The interaction between employment protection,
unemployment benefits and “economic turbulence”,
due, for example, to restructuring associated with
globalisation has been studied by Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2006) in simulations of a detailed search
model. Their finding is that high employment protec-
tion reduces unemployment in “tranquil” times, when
unemployment is mainly “frictional”. The explana-
tion is that the inflow into unemployment is reduced
at the same time as hirings are left unchanged. (In
general equilibrium, expected future layoff costs are
fully shifted on to employees through lower wages.)
The main cause of high unemployment in the
Ljungqvist-Sargent model is the interaction between
high turbulence, causing large human capital losses
for laid-off workers, and generous unemployment
benefits, tied to previous earnings. This interaction
leads many unemployed workers to set their reserva-
tion wages above the wages at which they are offered
new employment: effective replacement rates – the
ratios between the unemployment benefit and the
earnings on a new job – become much higher than for-
mal rates – the ratio between unemployment benefits
and previous earnings. If the degree of turbulence is
moderate, more employment protection will still not
raise unemployment. This will be the case only at high
degrees of turbulence, but the result is then condi-
tional on high unemployment benefits preventing lay-
off costs from being shifted on to employees in the
form of lower wages.
Another problem with the low employment protec-
tion explanation of unemployment reductions in
Denmark is that the degree of protection has stayed
more or less unchanged over the last two decades. The
only major change is that restrictions on renewals of
temporary employment contracts were abolished in
16 See, for example, Hagberg et al. (2006).
17 Sapir (2005) goes so far as to claim that ”protecting jobs with
employment legislation is definitely detrimental to employment,
whereas protecting workers with unemployment insurance is poten-
tially useful for employment”.
18 There are exceptions, such as Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta
(1998) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), who find that a high
degree of employment protection may raise unemployment under
certain conditions. Belot and van Ours (2004) find instead that
stricter employment protection reduces unemployment.1990. But since these contracts play a rather modest
role – only covering around eight percent of employ-
ees – the changes have been judged to be of limited
importance (Andersen and Svarer 2006).
Unlike for Sweden and Finland, empirical evidence
suggests that the bulk of the unemployment decline
in Denmark is explained by a reduction in structur-
al unemployment (OECD 2006c, Bassanini and
Duval 2006).19 A further indication is that wage in-
creases over the last decade have been much lower
than predicted by earlier estimated Phillips curves
(Det ökonomiske råd 2003, Andersen and Svarer
2006).
The OECD regularly evaluates the amount of labour
market reforms in the member countries (Brandt,
Burniaux and Duval 2005 is a recent such attempt.)
Interestingly enough, Denmark is ranked as number
one in terms of total reform effort between 1994 and
2004. Out of seven areas, active labour market policy
and unemployment benefits are identified as the
areas where reforms have been by far the largest.
There has also been a fair amount of reform relating
to wage formation (see Section 2) and pension
schemes (disability, early retirement as well as old-age
pensions). The area with the least reform is employ-
ment protection.20
Also in the Danish policy discussion, more ambitious
activation efforts and the reforms of the unemploy-
ment benefit system have been emphasised. Although
the benefit system is still the most generous in the
OECD, the reduction in generosity has been very sub-
stantial (Det ökonomiske råd 2003, Andersen and
Svarer 2006). In 1993, the maximum duration of
unemployment benefits was formally seven years.
Eligibility could, however, be renewed through partic-
ipation in “active” labour market programmes, which
implied in effect unlimited benefit duration. After
that, maximum duration has been cut in steps to four
years today, and eligibility can no longer be renewed
through participation in activation programmes.
After benefits have expired, only unemployment assis-
tance, which is significantly lower than benefits and
conditional on wealth, total income of the household
etc., is available. Benefit generosity has also been
reduced because the maximum benefit that can be
paid out has not risen pari passus with wages. The
result is a reduction in the OECD summary measure
of the average gross replacement rate (weighted over
various worker types and a five-year period) of the
order of magnitude of 15 percentage points between
1995 and 2003 (Brandt, Burniaux and Duval 2005).
The other major change in labour market institutions
concerns activation policies. Participation in activa-
tion programmes has gradually come to be offered at
much earlier stages. There has also been a gradual
strengthening of the obligation to take part in such
programmes as a precondition for receiving unem-
ployment benefits. Today, all unemployed are obliged
to accept an offer to participate in an activation pro-
gramme after twelve months of unemployment.
Although the larger emphasis on activation measures
– with a successively increasing fraction of the unem-
ployed participating in such programmes – has
received a lot of attention, evaluations of programme
effects on labour market outcomes have usually not
been very encouraging (Det ökonomiske råd 2003,
Andersen and Svarer 2006). Most programmes do not
appear to have raised regular employment opportuni-
ties of participants, because locking-in effects of pro-
grammes during their duration seem to have domi-
nated the small increases in transitions to regular
employment that, according to some studies, have
occurred after completion of the programmes.
Instead, activation policies seem mainly to have had
ex ante threat effects, shortening unemployment dura-
tion by changing the behaviour of the unemployed
prior to programme participation (Rosholm and
Svarer 2004).
The threat effect in conjunction with less benefit gen-
erosity may have been particularly successful in low-
ering youth unemployment in Denmark (see the dis-
cussion of Table 4.10).21 Unemployed below the age
of 25 now have to choose between going into educa-
tion for one year and a half (receiving only half the
unemployment benefit), finding work or receiving
reduced unemployment assistance.
The panel data study by Bassanini and Duval (2006)
provides an attempt at attributing changes in struc-
tural unemployment among OECD countries to dif-
ferent factors. According to the study, the three main
explanations of the reduction in the Danish structur-
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19 A similar judgement has been made by the Danish Ministry of
Finance (Finansministeriet 2002), whereas the Danish Economic
Council attributes around 30 to 40 percent of the fall in unemploy-
ment between 1993 and 2001 to a reduction in structural unemploy-
ment (Det ökonomiske råd 2003). 
20 The two remaining reform areas are working-time flexibility/part-
time work and taxes/social security contributions.
21 The first reform was made in 1996. It then applied only to young
people who had been unemployed for more than six months. From
1999 the rules apply to all unemployed young people. See Jensen,
Rosholm and Svarer (2003) and Andersen and Svarer (2006).EEAG Report 107
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al unemployment rate from 1982 to 2003 are in declin-
ing order: product market deregulations reduced tax
wedges and reduced benefit generosity. Product mar-
ket deregulations have contributed to lower unem-
ployment in all OECD countries, although somewhat
more so in Denmark than in most other countries.
The contribution of reduced tax wedges is above aver-
age. So is the contribution from less benefit generosi-
ty, although the contribution appears much smaller
than our discussion would suggest. A probable reason
could be that the measures of unemployment benefits
used do not fully capture the reduction in – the for-
merly very long – maximum duration.
An intriguing observation is that even after the bene-
fit cuts of the last decade, benefit generosity is still
very high in Denmark, in fact the highest in the
OECD area according to Table 4.1. This suggests
that the change in the benefit level that has occurred
may be more important than the current level. A pos-
sible interpretation of this phenomenon has been
provided by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1997). They
Box 4.1 
The labour-market reforms of the new Swedish government 
The discrepancy between high output growth and low employment growth has been a key issue in the Swedish economic policy 
debate. The stress has been on the high benefit dependency rate and how recorded unemployment significantly underestimates 
“true” unemployment.  
 Low employment among immigrants has been emphasised as a particularly difficult problem: Sweden is among the OECD 
countries with the largest employment gap between natives and foreign-born (OECD 2005a). An important explanation is that 
low-skilled refugees have constituted a significant share of immigration, but high minimum wages in collective agreements, 
pricing low-skilled workers out of the labour market, is also a probable contributing factor. A compressed wage structure in 
combination with high tax wedges has also hampered the growth of private service jobs (see Figure 4.10). 
The liberal-conservative parties made the employment issue the principal one in their 2006 parliamentary election campaigns. 
This is generally considered to have been a major factor behind their election victory. The new government has embarked on a 
path of labour market reforms. These include: 
• Lower unemployment benefits for long-term unemployed. The current 80 percent replacement rate (up to a ceiling wage 
income) has been cut to 70 percent after 200 days and to 65 percent after an additional 100 days (250 days for unemployed 
with children below 18). In addition, the maximum benefit level that can be obtained for the first 100 days has been reduced 
somewhat and access to unemployment insurance has been restricted.  
• An employment tax credit has been instituted, which reduces the average tax rate on earned income by around 1.5 percentage 
points and the marginal tax rate by 3 percentage points for most wage earners. 
• Tax deductability for union membership fees and fees for membership in the union-affiliated unemployment insurance funds, 
which administer unemployment insurance, has been abolished. Membership fees in the unemployment insurance funds have 
been raised. 
• The pay-roll tax rate for young people (19–24) will be reduced by 7.5 percentage points. 
• There will be a tax rebate on purchases of household-related services as well as a later reduction of the pay-roll tax rate for
employees in some service jobs. 
• The size of active labour market programmes will be cut by about one percentage point of the labour force. A new form of 
subsidised employment directed also against those on long-term sickness leave and disability pensions has been instituted. 
• The National Labour Market Board in charge of labour market programmes will be reformed and the employment services 
opened up to more competition. 
The reform programme thus contains both supply-side and demand-side measures. In the short term, the downsizing of active 
labour market programmes is likely to raise open unemployment, even if regular employment increases. In the longer term, one 
could expect substantial effects on structural unemployment. Even though all assessments are very uncertain, evaluations on the
basis of reduced-form (un)employment equations and structural wage and labour demand equations would suggest that the cuts in 
benefits, taxes and active labour market programmes might reduce open unemployment by around 0.5 percentage points and raise 
the regular employment rate by 1.5 to 2 percentage points in the long run.
a) This judgement does not take into account the effects 
of possible reductions in unionisation rates – due to the higher membership fees in unemployment insurance funds and the 
abolishment of tax deductability for union and unemployment membership fees – and the possibility of efficiency-enhancing 
reforms of employment services. 
Usually, there is political support for comprehensive labour market reforms only in deep economic crises when large deficit 
problems necessitate expenditure cuts (see, for example, Chapter 2 in EEAG 2004). The problem with supply-side reforms in such 
a situation is that it may take a long time for the positive employment effects to materialise when demand is low, as the increased 
supply must then gradually create its own demand. The current situation in Sweden is much more favourable, as reforms are made 
in a cyclical situation with high employment growth. Supply-side reforms can then more easily generate higher employment by 
reducing nominal wage increases relative to price and productivity increases. The main worry is that the trade union movement 
(mainly blue-collar workers) might choose to pursue militant wage claims to “compensate” for the reforms. 
a) These assessments are based on the “baseline equation” for an “average OECD country” in Bassanini and Duval (2006) and a study of wage 
formation by Forslund, Gottfries and Westermark (2005). pointed to the possibility of multiple equilibria. It
may have been possible in all three Scandinavian
countries to combine low unemployment with gener-
ous unemployment benefits in the 1960s and 1970s
because active labour market programmes could then
be used in an effective way to monitor the search
activities of the unemployed. But this only worked as
long as unemployment remained low. Once macro-
economic shocks rocked the system and caused large
unemployment rises, strict monitoring of the unem-
ployed was no longer possible. This might have
moved the economies to another high unemployment
equilibrium.22 It may not be possible to escape from
that without significant reductions of benefit gen-
erosity as in Denmark.
Why were labour market reforms politically feasible
in Denmark already in the mid-1990s? One possible
explanation is that employees were compensated by
the introduction of a number of paid voluntary leave
schemes. Although some of them were later abol-
ished, they may have bought time for the positive
effects of the other labour market reforms to materi-
alise (Carcillo et al. 2005). Another contributing fac-
tor may have been that the fiscal consolidation
achieved already in the 1980s provided room to com-
bine reforms in the mid-1990s with expansionary fis-
cal policy action (Det økonomiske råd 2003). It is
also conceivable that product market deregulations,
by reducing the rents to be shared between employ-
ers and employees, reduced the
political support for labour mar-
ket institutions designed to dis-
tribute some of these rents to
employees.
4.2 Hours actually worked
An alternative measure of labour
market performance is annual
hours worked per person of work-
ing age, which is shown in the sec-
ond column of Table 4.12. In
terms of this indicator, the Scan-
dinavian countries stand out less
than in terms of employment.
Annual hours per person of
working age are much higher
than in most continental EU
countries, but they are considerably lower than in, for
example, Switzerland, Japan, the US and Australia.
The explanation is that hours worked per employed
person is relatively low in the Scandinavian countries,
as shown in the fourth column. This is in particular
the case for Denmark and Sweden. Although working
time is even shorter in, for example, the Netherlands,
Germany, Belgium and France, employees in Den-
mark and Sweden work considerably shorter hours
than employees in the US and other Anglo-Saxon
countries.
A somewhat different picture of working time is given
by column 6, which shows hours worked per person in
dependent employment (that is excluding self-
employed persons) and where a correction has been
made for estimated underreporting of absences due to
sickness and parenthood.23 With this measure, the
three Scandinavian countries rank among the coun-
tries with the lowest hours of work per employee.
Indeed, Sweden ranks second from the bottom; only
the Netherlands has lower working time according to
this measure.
Figure 4.11 shows the development over time of hours
worked per person of working age in the Scandi-
navian countries and the euro area. As with employ-
ment, there was a sharp fall in Finland and Sweden in
the early 1990s followed by a partial recovery. In
Denmark, there was instead a trendwise reduction




22 Especially Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) have stressed the impor-
tance of such interaction between, on the one hand, macroeconom-
ic shocks and, on the other hand, labour market institutions such as
unemployment benefits. 
23 Such absences seem typically to be underreported by respondents
in labour force surveys. See, for example, Confederation of Swedish
Enterprise (2006) and Davis and Henrekson (2006).EEAG Report 109
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partial recovery. A comparison with Figure 4.8 reveals
that the recoveries are much smaller in terms of hours
worked than in terms of employment. Figure 4.12
shows that the trendwise reduction in hours worked
per person of working age in 1970 to 1995 in
Denmark had its counterpart in a trendwise reduction
in hours worked per employed
person. In Finland, there has
been a downward trend in work-
ing time over the whole period
shown, although reductions have
been much smaller than in
Denmark. Sweden shows the
most variable pattern, with
reductions in working time in the
1970s followed by increases in the
1980s, which then accelerated
during the economic crisis in the
1990s. During the first years of
the 2000s, hours worked per
employee fell again.
Table 4.13 helps explain the rel-




Average annual hours 




Average annual hours 
worked per employed 
person, 2005
Rank
Revised annual hours 




Denmark 1171 9 1551 16 1410 13
Finland 1133 13 1666 11 1491 9
Sweden 1166 10 1587 15 1349 14
Average Scandinavian 
countries 1158 - 1601 - 1417 -
Austria 1122 14 1636 13 1497 8
Belgium 936 20 1534 18 1451 12
France 956 18 1535 17 1467 11
Germany 940 19 1435 19 1480 10
Greece 1238 6 2053 2 1816 1
Ireland 1099 15 1638 12 1585 5
Italy 1030 16 1791 6 1533 7
Netherlands 984 17 1367 20 1223 15
Portugal 1137 12 1685 9 1688 2
Spain 1141 11 1775 7 1639 3
Euro area except 
Finland 1043 - 1645 - 1538
Switzerland 1258 5 1629 14 1586 4
UK 1214 8 1672 10 1546 6
US 1290 4 1804 5 - -
Australia 1297 3 1811 3 - -
New Zealand 1350 2 1809 4 - -
Average Anglo-Saxon 
countries 1288 - 1774 - - -
Japan 1230 7 1775 7 - -
South Korea 1525 1 2394 1 - -
Notes:
a) Average annual hours worked per person of working age have been calculated as hours per employed person times the 
employment rate. Hours worked per employed person for Korea and Switzerland are for 2004, employment rates for Sweden and 
the Netherlands are for 2004. – 
b) Absences due to sickness and parental leave have been counted twice to adjust for 
underreporting by respondents in labour force surveys.
Source: For average annual hours worked per person of working age and average annual hours worked per employed person: OECD 
(2006c). For revised annual hours worked per employed person: OECD (2004a). employee in Denmark and Sweden. In the Danish
case, the explanation is both a short “normal”work-
week and a low number of weeks worked during the
year. For Sweden, the normal work week is shorter
than the average in the table, but the most signifi-
cant difference to other countries is the low number
of weeks worked: in fact the lowest among the coun-
tries shown. This is not explained by unusually long
vacations, but by the much larger absence due to
sickness and parental leave in Sweden than else-
where.
The large sickness absence has been a hotly debated
issue in Sweden in recent years. Several factors are like-
ly to have contributed. Sickness insurance is generous
and medical assessment procedures have been lax:
according to OECD estimates, Swedish sickness insur-
ance is (together with that of
Norway) the most generous
among member countries (OECD
2003b, 2005a).24 The high em-
ployment rates for both females
and older workers are also con-
tributing factors, as sickness
absence rates for these groups are
significantly higher than for the
average employee (Riksförsäk-
ringsverket 2003).
A key issue in the Swedish em-
ployment debate has concerned
the interaction between sickness
absence and unemployment.
Unlike most other countries,
sickness absence has been highly
procyclical (see Figure 4.13). In
particular, the reduction in
unemployment from 1997 to
2002 was associated with a large
increase in sickness absence.
There are two possible explana-
tions for this pattern (SNS
2005). The first focuses on the
composition of employment: in
an upswing more persons with
health problems – and possibly
also more persons with low work
morale – are employed. The second explanation
stresses instead the disciplinary effect of unemploy-
ment: the incentives to turn up at work are weakened
in times of low unemployment, as there are more
alternative job opportunities open in case an
employee with high absence were forced to quit.
Taking absence from work into account puts
Swedish employment developments over the last
decade in a different perspective. As can be seen from
Figure 4.14, the recovery in the number of persons
actually at work has been much smaller than the rise
in recorded employment, which includes also those on
sick leave, parental leave, and study leave as well as
those on vacation! In 2006 there was a gap of 12 per-
centage points between the shares of working age





24 With the aggregate measure of generosi-
ty used, Sweden and Norway obtain the
index score 130. Other countries above the
OECD average of 100 are, for example,
Switzerland (126), Australia (122), Ger-
many and Spain (115), the Netherlands
(111), and Denmark (103). Countries
below the OECD average are, for example,
the US and the UK (80), Italy (84), France
(95), and Belgium (99).









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 At the same time as there is a negative time series cor-
relation between aggregate unemployment and sick-
ness absence, there is a positive cross-section correla-
tion over municipalities and regions (Riksför-
säkringsverket 2003). There is also a positive cross-
section correlation between the increase in sickness
absence in the first years of the 2000s and unemploy-
ment in the late 1990s (SNS 2005). This strongly sug-
gests that sickness insurance has to a large extent been
used as a form of unemployment insurance. A further
indication is that the relative replacement rate
between sick and unemployment insurance has been
shown to have a significant effect on the frequency of
“sickness absence” among the unemployed and that
this frequency increases when unemployed individuals
approach the termination of their unemployment
benefits (Larsson 2002).25
A major factor behind the increase in sickness
absence in Sweden from the late 1990s was an increase
in long-term sick leaves among the oldest age group
(60 to 64). A likely explanation is that access to dis-
ability pensions was tightened in 1997 when the prac-
tice of also taking labour market opportunities into
account was ended. This led to a fall in the inflow of
elderly workers into early retirement and a large
increase in “formal” labour force participation for
this group (SNS 2005).
The Swedish experiences provide a vivid illustration
of the interlinkages between different benefit sys-
tems and the dangers of judging
labour market performance by
some indicators only. Limiting
access to one benefit system
may just result in an overflow to
other systems. Developments in
2003 to 2005, when sickness
absence began to fall but the
inflow into disability pensions
surged again, is another exam-
ple. Not until in 2005 to 2006
was the reduction in sickness
absence accompanied by a fall
also in the inflow to early retire-
ment. This reflects stricter gate-
keeping in both the sickness
insurance and the early-retire-
ment systems. Finland also pro-
vides clear examples of linkages
between different benefit systems. In the second
half of the 1990s, more restricted access to disabil-
ity pensions for elderly workers led instead to an
increase in the number of so-called unemployment
pensioners. Further support for the hypothesis that
disability pensions are used as de facto unemploy-
ment benefits in Finland is provided by a strong
correlation across regions between unemployment
and disability pension recipiency rates (OECD
2006a).
The Scandinavian welfare model has certainly not
done away with normal economic incentives of bene-
fit recipients: on the contrary, the systems seem to be
characterised by extensive “benefit shopping” with
recipiency rates being highly responsive to relative
benefit rates and ease of access.
The interlinkages among the various benefits systems
provide an argument for looking at the total benefit
recipiency rate. This is done for Sweden in Figu-
re 4.15. The benefit recipiency rate in 2006 was
around 20 percent of the working-age population,
almost double the rate in 1970. Although the rate
peaked in 1995, the subsequent decline has been only
a few percentage points. Interestingly enough, Danish
developments in terms of the total number of benefit
recipients are very similar to Swedish ones, as shown
in Figure 4.16. Here, too, there was a trendwise
increase up to the mid-1990s. Compared to that, the
subsequent decline is marginal. So, in terms of total
benefit dependency, labour market developments in
the Nordic countries look far less impressive than in




25 In the Swedish system, an unemployed person has been able to
receive a sickness benefit – if registered as sick – and this way save
unemployment benefit days and thus extend the maximum benefit
period.EEAG Report 113
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5. Inflation and public finances
Yet another aspect of the macroeconomy concerns
inflation and public finances. On this count, all three
Scandinavian countries have recently been doing very
well.
5.1 Inflation and exchange rate policy
Figures 4.17a and 4.17b show inflation. All three
Scandinavian countries were characterised by high
inflation in the 1970s and 1980s, very much like
other European countries with the exception of
Germany. All three countries have subsequently par-
ticipated in the moderation of inflation that has
occurred throughout the OECD area. The patterns
and methods have, however, dif-
fered among the Scandinavian
countries.
Denmark was the first
Scandinavian country to opt for
a low-inflation policy. This was
done already in 1982 when the
Danish government, after a num-
ber of exchange-rate realign-
ments in 1979 to 1982, chose to
restore international cost com-
petitiveness through contractive
fiscal policy (including the so-
called “kartofellkur”– the “pota-
to cure”) as well as mandatory
wage freezes and abolishment of
wage indexation. Denmark was a
formal member of the ERM
already then and defended its exchange rate vigorous-
ly in the early 1980s through a high interest rate poli-
cy. Except for very temporary deviations, the fixed
exchange rate even survived the general European
exchange rate turbulence of the early 1990s. When the
monetary union started in 1999, Denmark remained
outside, but the fixed exchange rate – now to the euro
within ERM II – remains a cornerstone of the coun-
try’s low-inflation policy.
After large devaluations, Sweden and Finland both
tried to maintain fixed exchange rates during the
1980s and early 1990s. Although the policy commit-
ments to a fixed exchange rate (but outside the ERM
system) were gradually strengthened, these were not
credible because of the history of earlier exchange
rate devaluations and fiscal poli-
cies that were inconsistent with
the exchange rate pegs. There
were renewed bouts of inflation
in both countries around 1990.
The fixed exchange rates had to
be defended through very high
interest rates. In the end after
serious currency crises, both
countries were forced to let their
currencies float in 1992, which
led to large currency deprecia-





26 See, for example, Jonung (1999), Finans-
och penningpolitiskt bokslut för 1990-
talet (2000) or Hagberg, Jonung, Kiander
and Vartia (2006).The currency depreciations in Sweden and Finland
kick-started the recoveries after the deep recessions in
the early 1990s. Unlike in the past, they did not gen-
erate new inflation cycles. But the policies followed by
the two countries were very different. Finland entered
the ERM system in 1996 and joined the euro when it
started in 1999. In contrast, Sweden stayed outside
both the ERM and the EMU. Instead, the central
bank adopted an inflation target (2 percent with a tol-
erance margin around it of 1 percent in both direc-
tions) from 1995. In 1999, there was a major central
bank reform making the bank independent of the
political system in more or less the same way as the
ECB.
Past experiences of inflation-devaluation spirals had
in the end a large impact on the resolve to pursue low-
inflation policy in all three Scandinavians countries. It
is more difficult to understand why so different ways
of doing this were chosen: an
exchange rate peg in Denmark,
euro membership in Finland, and
inflation targeting under a flexi-
ble exchange rate in Sweden. This
illustrates how the underlying
motives for a policy change often
are the key determinants of
macroeconomic outcomes rather
than the exact institutional re-
forms. A comparison between
Sweden and Finland is instruc-
tive. In Finland, the need to stop
the earlier inflation-devaluation
cycles was advanced as an impor-
tant argument for adopting the
euro, whereas in Sweden the deci-
sion not to adopt the euro and a
fear that this might entail risks of
inflation motivated the move
towards an independent central
bank.27
5.2 Public finances
Figures 4.18 and 4.19 illustrate
the state of public finances in the
Scandinavian countries and the
eurozone. Recent developments
in the Scandinavian countries
contrast favourably with those in
the eurozone. All three countries
now run sizable budget surpluses
and government debt ratios are
on a downward path.
The recent strong public finances in the Scandinavian
countries are in stark contrast to earlier experiences.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, budget deficits were
larger in Denmark than in the eurozone and govern-
ment indebtedness was high and rapidly increasing.
Both Finland and Sweden suffered dramatic deterio-
rations of their fiscal situations during the recessions
in the early 1990s.
The common denominator for all three Scandinavian
countries is that acute fiscal crises triggered a rethink-
ing of fiscal policy and forged a consensus on the need





27 On the basis of various government policy statements, Calmfors
(2005) argues that this motive was much more important in Sweden
than EU requirements on the independence of the central bank.
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more conducive to a radical change in course than the
more creeping fiscal crises experienced in recent years
in, for example, France, Germany and Italy.
The experiences in Sweden are particularly instruc-
tive. When the fiscal deficit reached 12 percent of
GDP in 1994, fiscal consolidation – independent of
the cyclical situation – became the overriding priority
of the social democratic government that took office
that year. This triggered a number of reforms.
Numerical targets for deficits and government debt
developments were formulated (from 1994), multi-
year expenditure ceilings were instituted (from 1996),
and the whole budget process was reformed by the
introduction of a top-down approach making it
impossible to decide in Parliament on expenditure
increases without cutting other expenditures, once the
overall budget is approved (1997). Government policy
documents from these years indicate that the main
motive was to restore the free-
dom of action of fiscal policy,
which had been seriously circum-
scribed by the earlier debt
increases: in 1993 to 1996 fears
that the process of fiscal consoli-
dation would be halted led to
repeated interest rate hikes and
large exchange rate movements.28
Calmfors (2005) maintained that
this motive was much more
important for fiscal consolida-
tion than the EMU convergence
criteria and the sability pact
requirements, although these lent
more legitimacy to the fiscal con-
solidation and probably speeded
it up: it was an explicit aim of the
government to reduce the budget deficit below three
percent of GDP in 1997, so that Sweden would retain
the option of entering the monetary union when it
started in 1999. The government even argued that
staying outside the EMU imposed even tougher
requirements of fiscal discipline to maintain credibili-
ty of low inflation than membership.29
The fiscal policy process in Finland in the 1990s had
large similarities to the one in Sweden. The huge dete-
rioration in the budget situation in 1992 to 1993 made
fiscal consolidation a central political concern. The
desire to meet the requirements for EMU membership
was another motive for the consolidation programme
initiated in 1995. The programme covered the govern-
ment’s four-year term in office and subsequent gov-
ernments have continued the practice of agreeing
such medium-term fiscal goals. 
As discussed above, the tighten-
ing of fiscal discipline in Den-
mark from 1982 was very much
tied to the policy of using the
fixed exchange rate as an anchor
for low inflation. The main task
of fiscal policy has been seen as
keeping current inflation in line
with that in the other ERM
countries (today mainly the euro-
zone) and preventing large bud-
get deficits from threatening the
Figure 4.18
Figure 4.19
28 See Jonung (1999) and Finans- och pen-
ningpolitiskt bokslut för 1990-talet
(2000).
29 Proposition 1996/97:1.credibility of low inflation in the future. The policy of
fiscal discipline has not been underpinned by any
major reforms of fiscal policy institutions; instead it
seems to build on a general consensus on the need for
such policy.30
5.3 Pension reform
As discussed extensively in the 2005 EEAG report,
the future development of age-related expenditures
represents a threat to long-run fiscal sustainability in
all EU countries. One way to deal with the problem
is pension reform. Such reforms have been carried
out in all three Scandinavian countries. The most
encompassing reform was the Swedish one, which
was decided in 1994 after a multi-party agreement.31
The pension system remains largely a pay-as-you-go
one, but it was transformed from one with defined
benefits to one with defined contributions. Pensions
are now indexed to per-capita wage growth. This
could potentially involve risks for the sustainability
of the system due to unfavourable employment or
demographic developments. To deal with this, there
is a balancing mechanism that limits the degree of
indexation if the long-run financial stability of the
system is threatened: this occurs if the capitalised
value of contributions plus the assets in the buffer
funds fall below the value of pension liabilities. The
balancing mechanism is automatic according to a
predetermined formula and does not require any
political decisions. The new pension system has also
introduced a flexible retirement age, where later
retirement gives a higher pension. The radical pen-
sion reform in Sweden can only be understood as
part of the consolidation efforts during the fiscal cri-
sis in the first half of the 1990s.
There have also been pension reforms in Finland and
Denmark, but these have been smaller and later than
in Sweden. Some of the changes will first take effect
after substantial lags. The state pension systems in
these countries are also largely pay-as-go ones but still
with defined benefits. Reforms in Finland in 2006,
however, introduced indexing of pension benefits to
life expectancy (from 2010) to ensure that increased
longevity does not raise pension costs. The reform
also introduces a flexible retirement age and provides
financial incentives for later retirement. The overall
effects of the reform are, however, difficult to judge, as
the possibilities to retire early (for disability reasons)
or obtain unemployment benefits up to retirement
remain large despite some changes restricting access
to these systems (OECD 2006a).
In Denmark, there was also a pension reform in 2006.
The main ingredients were a postponement of the eli-
gibility age for early retirement by two years (to be
implemented in 2019 to 2023) and an increase in the
old-age retirement age also by two years (to be imple-
mented in 2025 to 2029). When implemented, these
ages will be indexed to life expectancy (maintaining
an expected pension period of 19.5 years).
Projected rises in pension costs to 2050 are smaller in
all three Scandinavian countries than in the average
EU15 country – 1.3 percent of GDP in Sweden and
2.7 percent in Denmark and Finland versus the EU15
average of 3.0 percent – according to European Com-
mission estimates (European Commission 2006a).
Overall projected rises of age-related expenditures are
also smaller in Sweden and Denmark (3.6 percent and
4.5 percent of GDP respectively) than in the average
EU15 country (4.8 percent), but somewhat larger in
Finland (5.1 percent). But in view of the current bud-
get surpluses, fiscal sustainability risks have been
judged by the European Commission to be small in all
three Scandinavian countries (European Commission
2006b).
6. Conclusions
There is no such thing as a Scandinavian economic
miracle. But the Scandinavian countries have in many
respects done better recently than most of the euro-
zone countries. Public finances are in a better shape
and there has been no weakening of fiscal discipline.
Output growth has been substantially higher in
Finland and Sweden than in the eurozone, although
the difference in income growth after accounting for
terms-of-trade changes is considerably smaller. In the
second half of the 1990s, the high output growth in
Finland and Sweden reflected to a large extent a
recovery from deep recessions. So, part of the good
performance is explained by having done poorly
before.
But there is certainly more to recent output growth in
Finland and Sweden than a catching-up from the
crises of the early 1990s. The two countries have not
shared in the trendwise decline in productivity growth
in many of the eurozone countries. In Sweden, trend
productivity growth seems even to have increased rel-
EEAG Report 116
Chapter 4
30 Finansministeriet (2002) and Andersen and Chiriaeva (2006).
31 See Könberg, Palmer and Sundén (2006) for a more detailed ac-
count.EEAG Report 117
Chapter 4
ative to the 1980s. The favourable productivity devel-
opments in Finland and Sweden are linked to ICT
technology: high productivity growth in ICT-produc-
ing sectors has made a significant contribution to
overall productivity growth. The other side of the
coin is falling relative prices of ICT products, which
have led to terms-of-trade losses. The importance of
investment in ICT capital relative to non-ICT capital
has also been larger than in most eurozone countries.
It is a plausible hypothesis that the interaction
between a skilled work force and ICT investment has
contributed to rapid diffusion of ICT technology in
the Scandinavian countries. High spending on R&D
is also likely to have been an important factor for pro-
ductivity growth.
In all the Scandinavian countries there have been sub-
stantial product market deregulations. They are likely
to have had important productivity-increasing effects.
The level of product market regulations is lower than
in most eurozone countries, although not as low as in
Anglo-Saxon countries. The changes in product mar-
ket regulations were earlier than in most Continental
Western European countries.
In terms of employment, Denmark has been doing
particularly well since the early 1990s and is today one
of the OECD countries with the highest overall
employment as a ratio of working-age population.
Total employment is also very high in Sweden, but
somewhat lower in Finland. In the latter two coun-
tries, there has been a recovery from the large falls in
employment in the first half of the 1990s, but employ-
ment has been far from restored to earlier levels.
The Danish flexicurity model with low employment
protection, but generous unemployment benefits, has
been claimed to be the main explanation of the
favourable employment developments in Denmark.
This is largely a myth. Instead, the employment rise in
Denmark is mainly explained by significant reduc-
tions in the generosity of unemployment benefits and
tougher requirements on the unemployed. 
Total hours worked in the Scandinavian countries (at
least as reported) are higher than in most euro area
countries, but significantly lower than in non-
European OECD countries like the US. In Sweden,
this reflects to a large extent high sickness absence,
which rose at the same time as unemployment fell in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. This suggests that there
may be a substantial amount of concealed unemploy-
ment in other social insurance systems than the unem-
ployment benefit system. Indeed, benefit dependency
rates are high in the Scandinavian countries and have
not come down much from the mid-1990s.
Does the Scandinavian labour market model repre-
sent another way of achieving high employment
than the Anglo-Saxon one? The answer is both yes
and no. 
The Scandinavian model is less successful in generat-
ing many hours worked than in generating high
employment rates. To understand the employment-
generating capacity, it is necessary to see how differ-
ent parts of the system interact. High and progressive
taxes discourage work in general, but also finance
generous childcare provisions and make it profitable
to split household income between two breadwinners.
This, together with separate taxation and the absence
of dependent spouse deductions, is conducive to high
female employment, which is the main contributing
factor to high overall employment in the Scandi-
navian countries. A fairly high degree of coordination
of wage bargaining may also help restrain wages
despite high degrees of unionisation, high taxes and
generous unemployment benefits.
At the same time, recent improvements in macroeco-
nomic performance in the Scandinavian countries
have been associated with limited – but yet clear –
steps in a market-liberal (Anglo-Saxon) direction.
This is obvious in terms of product market deregula-
tions in all the three Scandinavian countries. Den-
mark provides a good example of how limited reduc-
tions in benefit generosity – still leaving in place a
generous system – can help reduce structural unem-
ployment very significantly. Sweden has provided a
contrast. The earlier absence of labour market re-
forms was associated with what seems to be more or
less unchanged structural unemployment. It remains
to be seen how effective the labour market reforms of
the new liberal-conservative government, which took
office in the autumn of 2006, will be.
Perhaps, the most important lesson from the
Scandinavian experiences is that steps in a market-lib-
eral direction can produce substantial macroeconom-
ic improvements, but that such reforms can still be
consistent with an economic system very different
from the Anglo-Saxon model. However, it is wrong to
see macroeconomic developments in the Scan-
dinavian countries as evidence that market-liberal
reforms are not needed if one wants to stimulate out-
put and employment. Instead, Scandinavian experi-ences support the reverse hypothesis. They provide
strong arguments for Continental European countries
to reduce product market regulations to the
Scandinavian level and beyond as well as to reduce
unemployment benefit replacement rates and increase
requirements on the unemployed. The Scandinavian
experiences also point to the importance of address-
ing benefit generosity in all social insurance systems
at the same time: the risk of partial reforms is that
they result mainly in large overflows of benefit recipi-
ents from one insurance system to another. 
Another important lesson from the Scandinavian
countries is about the benefits of having a deep crisis.
Denmark had that in terms of public finances and
employment already in the early 1980s, which helped
form a consensus on the need for fiscal consolidation.
A new unemployment crisis in the early 1990s trig-
gered substantial reforms of unemployment insurance
and labour market policy. Finland and Sweden had
acute unemployment and public finance crises in 1991
to 94. This led to a radical re-thinking of fiscal policy
in both countries, most so in Sweden where fiscal dis-
cipline had been the weakest. The main characteristic
of the “Scandinavian miracle” may simply be earlier
sharp crises – conflicting with generally held percep-
tions of the superiority of the own model – which are
much more conducive to policy change than more
creeping crises (as in France or Germany) or continu-
ous crisis (as in Italy). And the most important policy
changes may not necessarily be radical reforms of
institutions but rather the curbing of excesses that
may over time accumulate in any system. Some of the
Scandinavian experiences illustrate clearly the bene-
fits from reaching a consensus on such measured
reform.
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